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RESTORING THE STATUTORY SAFETY-VALVE 
FOR IMMIGRANT CRIME VICTIMS: PREMIUM 
PROCESSING FOR INTERIM U VISA BENEFITS 
Jason A. Cade & Mary Honeychurch 
ABSTRACT—This Essay focuses on the U visa, a critical government 
program that has thus far failed to live up to its significant potential. 
Congress enacted the U visa to aid undocumented victims of serious crime 
and incentivize them to assist law enforcement without fear of deportation. 
The reality, however, is that noncitizens eligible for U status still languish in 
limbo for many years while remaining vulnerable to deportation and 
workplace exploitation. This is in large part due to the fact that United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has never devoted sufficient 
resources to processing these cases. As a result, the potential benefits of the 
U visa remain underrealized and communities are left less safe. In an era of 
sustained focus on enforcement and increased instability within immigrant 
communities, the situation becomes ever more urgent. This Essay introduces 
and defends a simple administrative innovation that would dramatically 
improve the process: a premium processing route for interim approvals and 
employment authorization. Although our proposal cannot resolve all the 
underlying problems, it is pragmatic, easily implemented, and superior to the 
status quo. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay addresses an important statutory measure designed to 
protect crime victims and communities that thus far has failed to live up to 
its potential. Congress enacted the “U” nonimmigrant category in 2000 to 
provide humanitarian aid to noncitizen crime victims residing in the United 
States and to encourage them to assist local, state, or federal law enforcement 
without fear of deportation.1 The statutorily-imposed cap of 10,000 annual U 
visas2 per year, however, has proven severely inadequate to address the 
number of noncitizens eligible for relief, resulting in a waitlist that will likely 
take more than ten years to clear.3 This deep backlog, which grows 
exponentially each year, leaves U applicants in a precarious state and 
 
 1 Jason A. Cade & Meghan L. Flanagan, Five Steps to a Better U: Improving the Crime-Fighting 
Visa, 21 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 85, 90–91 (2017) (describing the legislative history and purposes of the 
U visa); Lisa Locher, “U Visa” Relief for Undocumented Victims of Crime, 61 Bos. B.J. 24 (2017); see 
also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2018); Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. 
L. No. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464, 1533–37 (2000) (amended 2006). 
 2 In this Essay, we follow convention by using the terms “U status” and “U visa” more or less 
interchangeably. More precisely, U status is a nonimmigrant status that allows particular noncitizen 
victims of crime to stay in the United States for a temporary but renewable period and obtain employment 
authorization. U visas, on the other hand, permit persons outside the United States who qualify for U 
status (and who are not found inadmissible) to process through a U.S. consulate and lawfully enter the 
country. 
 3 See infra Part I. 
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significantly undercuts the protection that Congress intended the legislation 
to provide. 
Fortunately, Congress recognized this problem and in 2008 amended 
the U visa statute to authorize the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) to “grant work authorization to any alien who has a 
pending, bona fide application” for U status.4 In other words, for over a 
decade, § 1184(p)(6) has empowered the agency to provide applicants and 
their family members with permission to work at any point in the interim 
before their visa numbers become current, at which time a final adjudication 
will be made.5 Federal regulations, in turn, authorize deferred action for 
noncitizens on the U visa waitlist.6 Federal law thus provides a safety-valve 
to compensate for the oversubscribed annual quota on U visas, ensuring that 
undocumented noncitizens who report crime and cooperate with law 
enforcement are protected. 
The problem, however, is that USCIS has never allocated sufficient 
resources to adjudicate these interim benefits in a timely fashion.7 In fact, in 
recent litigation the agency conceded that it never implemented the statutory 
safety-valve at all.8 Instead, agency workers do virtually nothing with a U 
visa application until it has been pending for approximately four years, at 
which time it receives a full merits adjudication, resulting in either a denial 
or placement on a waitlist.9 
 
 4 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 
122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (2018)). 
 5 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (“The Secretary may grant work authorization to any alien who has a 
pending, bona fide application for nonimmigrant status under section 1101(a)(15)(U) . . . .”). The 
sponsors of the statutory amendment expressed hope that USCIS would apply § 1184(p)(6) to adjudicate 
interim employment authorization within sixty days of filing the U application. See 154 CONG. REC. 
24,603 (2008). 
 6 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2) (2018) (“USCIS will grant deferred action or parole to U–1 petitioners 
and qualifying family members while . . . on the waiting list. USCIS, in its discretion, may authorize 
employment for such petitioners and qualifying family members.”). 
 7 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 16-CV-7092, 2018 WL 4783977, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 
2018) (discussing the Department of Homeland Security’s contention that “section 1184(p)(6) is a 
‘discretionary statute’ which they ‘have never implemented.’”). 
 8 Id. (“‘USCIS does not grant work authorization to U-visa petitioners based on their petitions prior 
to adjudicating their petitions for the waitlist,’ even though section 1184(p)(6) EAD Pending Petition 
provides USCIS authority to do so.”) 
 9 Id. at *13 (“USCIS only adjudicates EAD applications from petitioners whose petitions have been 
deemed meritorious and placed on the [wait]list.”); see also Dustin J. Stubbs, Section Chief, Declaration 
to USCIS, at ¶¶ 5, 8 (Dec. 5, 2017) (on file with author) (explaining that USCIS only grants employment 
authorization and deferred action after an application is determined to be approvable but for the statutory 
cap and placed on the waitlist). But cf. Cecelia Friedman Levin et al., Notes and Practice Pointers, 
Vermont Service Center Stakeholder Event, ASISTA (Sept. 18, 2015), reprinted in SALLY KINOSHITA ET 
AL., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, THE U VISA: OBTAINING STATUS FOR IMMIGRANT VICTIMS 
OF CRIME, App. C-6 (5th ed. 2016) (reporting that USCIS has “stated that waitlisted cases are not ‘pre-
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Although the government has made little effort to justify this wholesale 
disregard of § 1184(p)(6), the issue appears to be a matter of how the agency 
allocates resources.10 According to Dustin Stubbs, the Section Chief who 
oversees the U visa team, in recent years “USCIS has devoted 100% of its U 
visa resources to moving the next 10,000 petitions from the waiting list 
through the approval process” at the point that visas are available.11 Thus, 
not only has the agency declined to allocate resources to implement 
Congress’s intended statutory safety-valve, it has fallen even further behind 
on the bifurcated merits reviews that finally places pending cases on the 
waitlist.12 
Why has USCIS failed to implement the statutory safety-valve for U 
applications (and dragged its feet on the waitlist)? In large part, the reasons 
may be financial. There is no fee associated with the primary component of 
a U visa application.13 Moreover, the statute requires USCIS to permit U 
applicants to request fee waivers for any associated forms (i.e., employment 
authorization and waivers of inadmissibility), which historically have been 
granted to those with low income.14 For all applicants, whether fees are 
waived or not, the conditional approval stage of the process does not generate 
any additional revenue for the agency. 
 
approved’ nor ‘conditional approvals’ and practitioners should be prepared to receive requests for 
additional evidence or notices terminating the case’s placement on the waitlist when appropriate.”). 
 10 Rodriguez, 2018 WL 4783977, at *15 (reporting USCIS’s claim that its failure to grant interim 
benefits to bona fide applications until placement on the waiting list after merits adjudication is 
“reasonable in light of the exponential increase in U filings” and the “complexity and time-consuming 
nature of the two-step adjudication process.”). 
 11 Stubbs, supra note 9, at ¶ 6. 
 12 Id. at ¶ 10 (“Through FY2016, the ‘cap processing’ step took approximately three months at the 
beginning of each fiscal year, and because the entire U visa adjudicative team was devoted to that process, 
during that period each year no subsequently-filed cases were reviewed for placement on the waiting 
list.”). Although the agency claims to have taken “several recent steps to reduce processing times and 
ensure petitioners are placed on the waiting list as quickly as is feasible,” id. at ¶ 13, only marginal and 
temporary improvements to the waitlist time adjudication time have resulted. See id. at ¶ 14 (indicating 
that USCIS’s efforts in 2018 achieved only a seventy-seven-day progression of the waitlist, from June 9, 
2014 to August 25, 2014). 
 13 Filing Fee, I-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status, USCIS https://www.uscis.gov/i-918 
[https://perma.cc/HF5V-MHZM] (indicating no filing fee for the U visa application). 
 14 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(l)(7) (providing that DHS “shall permit aliens to apply for a waiver of any 
fees associated with” various applications including U visas); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., USCIS, PM-
602-0011.1, FEE WAIVER GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED BY THE FINAL RULE OF THE USCIS FEE SCHEDULE: 
REVISIONS TO ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL (AFM) CHAPTER 10.9, AFM UPDATE AD11-26 (2011) 
[hereinafter FEE WAIVER GUIDELINES] (describing eligibility criteria for fee waiver requests, including 
evidence of very low-income). Advocates have reported that in the latter part of 2018 USCIS began 
denying more fee waiver requests in the U visa context, but as of this writing it is not clear whether this 
represents a substantive change in policy or rather just stricter evidentiary requirements. See infra note 
40. 
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This generous approach with U visa fees is commendable, and likely 
necessary to ensure that impoverished crime victims are not prohibited from 
pursuing U status on the basis of income. At the same time, the lopsided 
resource-revenue dynamic has not incentivized the agency to move quickly 
at the interim stage, and thus far litigation has been ineffective in coercing 
more timely consideration of work authorization.15 In the absence of 
financial incentives or congressional pressure, USCIS has allowed the 
backlog of unreviewed applications to grow ever larger, leaving a massive 
number of crime victims and their families languishing for years.16 
The upshot is that U applicants and their family members remain in a 
multi-year limbo, despite Congress’s wish that those with “bona fide” 
applications be considered for interim benefits.17 As a result, many victims 
of serious crimes may be deterred from cooperating with law enforcement 
out of fear that negative immigration consequences will result before they 
receive deferred action.18 When crime is unreported, perpetrators may remain 
at large, free to offend again. And those who nevertheless do come forward 
to assist law enforcement will for years remain unauthorized to work, unable 
to obtain driver’s licenses, and vulnerable to detention and deportation 
despite having bona fide applications for U status. These consequences are 
detrimental for individuals, their families, and communities. 
But a workable solution—one likely to be attractive to any 
administration—is within easy reach: a premium processing route for interim 
U benefits. Much like premium processing for certain nonimmigrant and 
employment-based visa categories, the U visa program could incorporate a 
fee-based expedited route, in which applicants could opt to pay for timely 
consideration of interim benefits. Ultimately, the U visa itself would be 
 
 15 See, e.g., Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament, 877 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that year-and-a-
half agency delay in processing work authorization for pending U application was reasonable and 
rejecting petitioner’s writ of mandamus to compel agency action). But see Rodriguez, 2018 WL 4783977, 
at *18 (ruling that U applications for employment authorization filed before the revision of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 274a.13(d) in January, 2017 have a “vested right” to adjudication within ninety days or the issuance of 
a temporary interim work document). 
 16 The total backlog of pending U visa applications currently exceeds 110,000 (not including family 
member applications). Number of Form I-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status, by Fiscal Year, 
Quarter, and Case Status 2009–2017, USCIS (last visited Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%2
0Forms%20Data/Victims/I918u_visastatistics_fy2017_qtr4.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8JD-3VAW]. The 
government has not been clear about how many of the total backlog of cases have been approved and 
placed on the waitlist, but at best its current processing time for this stage is four years. Rodriguez, 
2018 WL 4783977, at *2. By contrast, the agency has processed the analogous fee-based work 
authorization offered to applicants under Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) in a 
comparatively brief 120-day timeframe. See infra Part II.B. 
 17 See infra Part I. 
 18 See infra notes 28, 41 and accompanying text. 
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granted according to the date of initial receipt. Our proposed solution would 
merely expedite the conditional approval stage. Importantly, the agency 
could implement this expedited route as an administrative rule without 
legislative authorization. Indeed, as we discuss, Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) provides a recent model for a similar fee-based 
structure for deferred action.19 But unlike that much-litigated program, 
however, the authority for conditional approval and interim work 
authorization in U visa applications is clearly provided in the statute. 
This proposal promises many benefits, although it also portends some 
drawbacks. Chief among the likely downsides would be a timeliness-of-
processing division along socioeconomic status lines. While acknowledging 
the seriousness of this concern, we ultimately conclude that it is outweighed 
by the gains over the status quo, especially since the proposed reform is 
focused on the interim stage and would not affect the queue for final 
adjudication. Moreover, we recommend across-the-board improvements in 
processing times and anticipate positive spillover effects even for those who 
cannot afford the premium fee. Ultimately, our primary aspiration is to 
jumpstart a serious conversation between advocates and the agencies tasked 
with implementing the U process, ideally leading to necessary improvements 
that much time and litigation have failed to achieve. 
The Essay unfolds as follows. In Part I, we briefly explain the stages of 
the U visa process and the lengthy delays that currently plague the program. 
In Part II, we lay some of the groundwork for our proposal by discussing 
analogous features of employment-based premium processing and the 
DACA program. We also address USCIS’s authority to set fees. In Part III, 
we sketch a few salient design features that the government and the relevant 
stakeholders might consider, although we leave most programmatic details 
to the agency to work out in dialogue with advocates and others. Finally, in 
Part IV, we more fully address the benefits and potential downsides of 
expedited processing for U visa conditional approvals. 
I. PURPOSE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE U VISA 
Congress created the U visa in 2000 to provide a pathway to lawful 
status for immigrant victims of serious crime in this country who cooperate 
with law enforcement.20 The dual purposes behind the legislation were to 
 
 19 See infra Part II.B. 
 20 Cade & Flanagan, supra note 1, at 90–91. U status is a nonimmigrant—or in other words, 
temporary—status, valid for a period of four years, but recipients can apply for lawful permanent resident 
status after three years in certain circumstances. See Green Card for a Victim of a Crime (U 
Nonimmigrant), USCIS (last updated May 23, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/other-ways-get-
green-card/green-card-victim-crime-u-nonimmigrant [https://perma.cc/X4TQ-8RV6]. Eligible crimes 
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“enhance law enforcement’s ability to investigate and prosecute crimes” and 
to “further humanitarian interests by providing assistance to crime victims.”21 
The legislation has long enjoyed bipartisan support under both Republican 
and Democratic administrations.22 
Once a noncitizen has obtained the necessary law enforcement form 
certifying the criminal activity and the victim’s helpfulness, the agency’s 
current process consists of two stages: waitlist approval and final processing. 
Initially, the noncitizen submits the required application forms and 
supporting evidence of eligibility.23 Because the U visa category is subject to 
an annual cap of 10,000, each new application begins at the back of a very 
long line.24 Indeed, applications have exceeded that statutory cap every year 
since 2010.25 In fiscal year 2017, for example, the USCIS received 36,531 
principle applications.26 As a result, the backlog of pending U visa 
applications currently exceeds 110,000 (not including family member 
applications), and therefore, a new application filed today could take ten 
years or more to become current.27 
In 2008, Congress recognized that the applicants in the U category 
would run up against the annual cap, and accordingly delegated to USCIS 
the authority to grant employment authorization to U visa applicants whose 
cases appear to be “bona fide” but cannot yet be adjudicated due to the 
 
include those that occur in the United States and violate United States law. Visas for Victims of Criminal 
Activity, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/other-visa-categories/
visas-for-victims-of-criminal-activity.html [https://perma.cc/SU7U-VAN2]. 
 21 See Cade & Flanagan, supra note 1, at 87–88, 90–91 (discussing the legislative history and 
purposes of the U visa); see also Michael Kagan, Immigrant Victims, Immigrant Accusers, 48 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 919–29 (2015). 
 22 See Cade & Flanagan, supra note 1, at 91 (discussing the enactment of the U category and 
subsequent amendments expanding eligibility). 
 23 To qualify for U status, a noncitizen must establish that he or she “has suffered substantial physical 
or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of criminal activity” and provide a certification for 
law enforcement that he or she was helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in the investigation 
or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I)–(III) (2018); 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 214.14(a)(2)–(3) (2018). 
 24 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A) (2018). Derivative family member U applications do not count towards 
the 10,000 annual cap. Id. 
 25 Note that although Congress enacted the U visa provision in 2000, USCIS did not issue 
implementing regulations or begin adjudicating visas until October 2007. The first year that the agency 
released data about the number of cases received and approved was 2009. Number of Form I-918, supra 
note 16. 
 26 See id. 
 27 Id.; see also Cade & Flanagan, supra note 1, at 92 n.32 (“Some of these pending applications will 
be denied or abandoned, and noncitizens sometimes are in a position to submit more than one U visa 
application. Thus, it is not possible to predict exactly how long it will take to clear the backlog, though it 
will likely verge on a decade.”); Check Case Processing Times, USCIS (last visited Sept. 30, 2018), 
https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/#mainContent [https://perma.cc/9PRF-BN7T]. 
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backlog.28 The sponsors of the bill expressed hope that USCIS would issue 
work authorization to bona fide U applicants within sixty days, and that, in 
any event, applicants “should not have to wait for up to a year before they 
can support themselves and their families.”29 As enacted, however, the 
provision does not specify a timeline for this critical interim relief. 
The agency, it turns out, has never allocated resources to implement the 
statutory safety-valve, which it interprets as entirely discretionary. Instead, 
USCIS eventually conducts a full-merits adjudication of pending 
applications, at which time the application is either denied or placed on a 
waitlist.30 Those placed on the waitlist receive deferred action (a form of 
prosecutorial discretion)31 and consideration for employment authorization. 
Unfortunately, due to the agency’s failure to allocate resources 
commensurate with the U visa category’s demand, the current delay for 
waitlist adjudication is estimated to be around four years but could be even 
longer.32 
The conditional approval stage of the U visa process therefore needs an 
upgrade. Thus far, litigation has failed to correct agency policy on a broad 
scale under both the Obama and Trump administrations.33 The statute does 
 
 28 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (2018) (“The Secretary may grant work authorization to any alien who has 
a pending, bona fide application for nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15)(U) of this title.”); see 
also 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2) (2018) (“USCIS will grant deferred action or parole to U-1 petitioners and 
qualifying family members while . . . on the waiting list. USCIS, in its discretion, may authorize 
employment for such petitioners and qualifying family members.”). 
 29 See 154 CONG. REC. 24,603 (2008). 
 30  Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 16-CV-7092, 2018 WL 4783977, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) 
(“USCIS only adjudicates EAD applications from petitioners whose petitions have been deemed 
meritorious and placed on the [wait]list.”); Stubbs, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 5, 8 (explaining that USCIS only 
grants employment authorization and deferred action after it is determined to be approvable but for the 
statutory cap and placed on the waitlist). 
 31 Deferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion rather than a full-fledged form of 
nonimmigrant status. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2018). 
 32 Check Case Processing Times, supra note 27 (indicating a 48 to 48.5 month wait for Vermont 
Service Center adjudication of I-918 interim immigration benefits); see also Sarah Bronstein, Changes to 
U Visa Processing in Fiscal Year 2017, CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC. (last visited Aug. 7, 
2018), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/immigration-and-nationality-act-limited-number-u-visas-fiscal-
year-2017 [https://perma.cc/EL44-L89Z] (noting an approximately 2.5-year processing delay as of 
September 15, 2016, when the backlog was significantly smaller than it is at present); see also Stubbs, 
supra note 9, at ¶¶ 6, 10 (noting that in recent years all available U visa resources were consumed with 
processing applicants already on the waitlist, such that no new cases were being considered for addition 
to the waitlist). 
 33 See Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament, 877 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that a year-and-a-half 
agency delay in processing work authorization for pending U application was reasonable and rejecting 
petitioner’s writ of mandamus to compel agency action); Solis v. Cissna, No. CV-9:18-00083-MBS 
(D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2018) (denying government motion to dismiss Administrative Procedure Act complaint 
that delay of thirty-seven months for U waitlist adjudication was unreasonable agency action); Haus v. 
Nielsen, No. 17 C 4972, 2018 WL 1035870, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2018) (denying government motion 
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not specify a timeline for interim adjudication, as noted, and admittedly there 
is some ambiguity about whether the authority is discretionary.34 Thus far 
Congress has declined to exert further pressure on the agency to improve the 
implementation of § 1184(p)(6). 
As we have suggested, a central problem with the scheme is that USCIS 
lacks financial incentive to promptly adjudicate conditional approvals. The 
application itself (Form I-918) does not require a filing fee, likely in 
recognition of the fact that many immigrant crime victims are very low-
income.35 To be sure, this does not mean the U process is cost-free. In 
addition to expenditures associated with preparing the evidentiary support 
for the application (often including attorney’s fees, psychological 
evaluations, passport fees, and other materials), several associated agency 
forms do require fees, unless waived by the agency. For instance, most 
applicants and qualifying family members request employment authorization 
on the basis of both anticipated interim deferred action and U status,36 and 
each application currently requires a fee of $410 per individual.37 
Additionally, USCIS may waive many grounds of inadmissibility for U visa 
applications if doing so would be “in the public or national interest.”38 This 
waiver currently requires a filing fee of $930.39 At the same time, however, 
many U visa applicants are eligible for and historically have received fee 
waivers based on low-income status.40 Thus, the entire U visa category 
 
to dismiss motion to compel action after three year delay in processing interim work authorization); 
Rodriguez, 2018 WL 4783977 (denying government motion to dismiss APA complaint to compel 
adjudication on U application pending for over three years and proceeding to discovery on question of 
reasonableness). 
 34 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (2018) (“The Secretary may grant work authorization to any alien who 
has a pending, bona fide application for nonimmigrant status under section 1101(a)(15)(U).”). But see 
Rodriguez, 2018 WL 4783977, at *12 (concluding that Congress made adjudication of interim 
employment authorization mandatory and only intended approvals to be discretionary). 
 35 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1)(i)(VV) (2018). 
 36 See Levin et al., supra note 9 (suggesting this course of action). While principle applicants 
historically only needed to submit one application for employment authorization, in February of 2017 the 
U visa application was revised to no longer allow a built-in request for a work document. See Rodriguez, 
2018 WL 4783977, at *8. 
 37 8 C.F.R. § 103(b)(1)(i)(II) (2018). 
 38 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14) (2018). 
 39 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1)(i)(P) (2018). 
 40 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(l)(7) (requiring the agency to consider fee waiver requests in U cases); FEE 
WAIVER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at § 10.9(a)(4) (indicating that USCIS may waive any fees 
associated with the filing of any benefit request by a U visa applicant, including filings that are not 
otherwise eligible for a fee waiver or are eligible only for a conditional fee waiver). In the summer of 
2018, “[n]umerous practitioners . . . reported a significant increase in fee waiver denials from the 
Vermont Service Center in . . . U visa . . . applications.” Letter to Maureen Dunn, Chief, Family 
Immigration and Victim Protection Division, USCIS, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 30, 2018), available 
at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sq_CtrhuAiiKGayzsT9wQld3ZglmFfFK/view [https://perma.cc/
N8PQ-DPPN]. It is unclear as of this writing whether the substantive criteria for adjudicating fee waivers 
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appears to generate very little revenue for USCIS. The adjudication and 
processing of interim benefits in this scheme equates to additional agency 
work for no additional revenue. 
In light of this resource-revenue imbalance, it is unsurprising (though 
not excusable) that multiple administrations have neglected to promptly 
adjudicate interim U visa benefits. Section 1184(p)(6), from the agency’s 
perspective, is essentially an unfunded mandate. Nevertheless, the backlog 
is problematic because it undermines Congress’s goals with both the U visa 
and the safety-valve. Under these circumstances, many noncitizens who are 
eligible for U status will not risk contact with law enforcement.41 Those who 
do apply remain in a precarious limbo for many years, vulnerable to 
exploitation by unscrupulous employers and without safeguards against 
removal from the country for unlawful presence, despite Congress’s wish 
that victims of serious crime who assist law enforcement be protected.42 
II. AGENCY PARALLELS AND PRECEDENTS 
The preceding discussion suggests the need for program modifications 
that would increase agency incentives and ensure more timely consideration 
of interim benefits in the U process. If litigation continues to fail to produce 
corrective action, a reasonably structured fee-based expedited processing 
route for interim adjudication would benefit many noncitizens. In this Part, 
we begin to lay the groundwork for our proposal. In particular, we hope to 
demonstrate that our suggestion is highly workable in practice by discussing 
 
has become stricter, however, or if the issue is rather that the agency is now requiring all U applicants to 
utilize the standardized form for waiver requests, with supporting documentation, which had not been 
mandatory previously. See, e.g., Practice Advisory: Fee Waivers for VAWA Self-Petitions, U and T Visa 
Applications, ASISTA, at 7 (Aug. 2018) (“[A]lthough we recognize that many applicants have been able 
to receive fee waivers without using the I-912 form in the past, ASISTA suggests it is now prudent to use 
the I-912 Fee Waiver form.”); USCIS Response to ASISTA Fee Waivers, ASISTA (reporting preliminary 
statement from USCIS that fee waivers in U visa applications will be “adjudicate[ed] using USCIS 
regulation and policy as written[,] to be consistent across the agency” and referring applicants to the 
official fee waiver form). 
 41 See Cade & Flanagan, supra note 1, at 86–87 (collecting examples); Mary Ann Dutton et al., 
Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: 
Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 293 (2000) (reporting on a study 
showing that fear of being deported is “either the first or second most intimidating factor that kept battered 
immigrants from seeking the services they needed to end the abusive relationship.”); Stacey Ivie & 
Natalie Nanasi, The U Visa: An Effective Resource for Law Enforcement, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT 
BULLETIN, Oct. 2009, at 10, 10 (“[T]he fear of deportation has created a class of silent victims . . . .”); 
US: Immigrants ‘Afraid to Call 911’: States Should Reject Corrosive ‘Secure Communities’ Program, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 15, 2014) https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/14/us-immigrants-afraid-
call-911 [https://perma.cc/TRQ4-JRBS]. 
 42 See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 22,048 (2000) (“These and other important measures will do a great 
deal to protect battered immigrants and their children from domestic violence and free them from the fear 
that often prevents them from prosecuting these crimes.”). 
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two recent agency programs that pursued analogous objectives through 
similar means. First, we discuss the USCIS’s premium processing program 
for certain nonimmigrant and employment visas. We then turn to the DACA 
program, which, despite ample resistance and criticism, successfully 
implemented a process for fee-based adjudication of deferred action and 
employment authorization on a much faster timetable than the current U 
process. The final section of this Part clarifies the agency’s authority to set 
fees for our proposed program. 
A. Premium Processing for Nonimmigrant- and Employment-Based Visa 
Categories 
In June 2001, responding to frustrations from the business community 
regarding the “snail-like pace of INS action on visa petitions for executives 
and critical employees,” the agency launched the premium processing 
program.43 For certain nonimmigrant visa categories, the agency offered 
expedited service, or “premium processing,” for an additional fee of 
$1,410.44 Cases filed through this route are processed within fifteen calendar 
days; USCIS is required to issue an approval, denial notice, notice of intent 
to deny, or request for evidence within that time frame (or refund the filing 
fee).45 In 2006, the program was expanded to encompass certain 
employment-based immigrant visa petitions as well as the nonimmigrant 
categories already covered.46 
The premium processing program has generally been regarded as 
successful, creating a regime in which an employer or attorney can call or 
email the agency officer and receive a prompt response.47 The employment-
visa expansion of the program has also been regarded as a worthwhile 
expense for employers willing and able to afford the additional cost.48 
Moreover, processing times for employers who chose not to pay the 
additional fee for premium processing have not significantly increased.49 
 
 43 Leigh Polk Cole, Progress Report on Customer Service Program Adopted by INS, 6 VT. EMP. L. 
LETTER 7, 7 (2002). 
 44 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(e) (2018). Note that this fee increased on October 1, 2018 from the prior $1,225 
amount. See Adjustment to Premium Processing Fee, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/08/31/2018-19108/adjustment-to-premium-
processing-fee [https://perma.cc/6BGX-WXDW]. 
 45 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(e)(2) (2018). 
 46 Jesse Goldstein, USCIS Expands Premium Processing Service, 17 MICH. EMP. L. LETTER 6 
(2006). 
 47 Cole, supra note 43. 
 48 Goldstein, supra note 46. 
 49 Cole, supra note 43. 
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B. Fee-Based Adjudication of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
DACA provides another analogue, demonstrating that USCIS is 
capable of expediently processing deferred action and employment 
authorization requests. On June 15, 2012, the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security announced that the agency would consider discretionary 
deferred action for qualifying individuals who came to the United States as 
children and met other criteria.50 USCIS began accepting DACA applications 
on August 15, 2012.51 The combined agency fees for deferred action and 
employment authorization requests initially amounted to $465.52 Later, the 
total fee increased to $495.53 
Although actual processing times have fluctuated over the years, the 
agency has largely met its goal of processing all requests within 120 days, a 
relatively quick timeline in comparison to the years-long wait in the U visa 
process.54 From the outset, DACA has been subject to litigation and 
controversy, due in part to its passage as an Executive Order rather than 
through congressional legislation.55 On September 5, 2017, Donald Trump 
announced that the USCIS would no longer accept initial or renewal 
applications for DACA after October 5, 2017, and that renewals would only 
be accepted for applicants whose DACA expired by March 5, 2018.56 
However, on January 9, 2018, U.S. District Court Judge William Alsup 
issued a nationwide injunction ordering USCIS to continue processing 
DACA renewals (though not initial applications).57 In the meantime, USCIS 
 
 50 PHILIP HORNIK, NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, 1 IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND DEFENSE § 8:52 (C. Boardman et al. eds., 3d ed. 2018). To qualify for DACA, applicants must 
have: (1) come to the United States before the age of sixteen and been under the age of thirty-one on June 
15, 2012; (2) been present in the United States on June 15, 2012; (3) been continuously residing in the 
United States for at least the prior five years; (4) been enrolled in school, graduated from high school, 
obtained a GED, or been honorably discharged from the United States military or Coast Guard; and (5) 
not posed a threat to national security or public safety. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. ($380 for work authorization plus $85 for biometrics). 
 53 Form I-765, Instructions for Application for Employment Authorization, USCIS, 
https://www.uscis.gov/i-821d [https://perma.cc/42D8-37DD] (indicating $410 fee for work authorization 
plus $85 for biometrics). 
 54 Frequently Asked Questions, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/archive/frequently-asked-questions#
renewal%20of%20DACA [https://perma.cc/LAH2-EGGN]. 
 55 HORNIK, supra note 50. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling in November 2018. See Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Melissa Quinn, 
DACA Case Could Hit the Supreme Court in a Matter of Months, Experts Say, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 
5, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/daca-case-could-hit-the-supreme-court-in-a-matter-of-
months-experts-say [https://perma.cc/5J6V-PE8K]. There are a number of additional pending lawsuits in 
connection to DACA, including one District Court decision issued in April 2018 reinstating the original 
DACA program (so new applications would be accepted in addition to renewals), but the court stayed its 
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has continued to accept and process DACA renewal applications.58 As of this 
Essay’s publication, the program remains in limited effect. 
Irrespective of the pending litigation, the relevant takeaway is that a 
similar timeline for agency consideration of deferred action and employment 
authorization would significantly benefit U applicants who opt-in to 
expedited processing (and possibly also benefiting those who cannot do so, 
as we explain below). Notably, as of September 2017, roughly 800,000 
applicants had received deferred action under DACA since it was enacted in 
2012.59 That is roughly 160,000 DACA applications processed per year—a 
figure that far exceeds the number of annual U visa applications, which tend 
to hover around 25,000 to 35,000 per year.60 Moreover, it bears emphasizing 
that there is clear statutory and regulatory authority for interim benefits in 
the U visa process.61 Thus, a premium processing option in this context 
should trigger little of the controversy that plagued DACA. 
C. Authority for Fee-Based Interim Processing 
In this final subsection, we pause to offer a few additional points 
regarding the authority for instituting a premium processing regime for 
interim U benefits. The agency would likely face few legal hurdles to 
implementing such a program. First, Congress directly provided in the statute 
 
own order for 90 days to allow the government to provide a better explanation of why it ended DACA. 
The District Court reaffirmed its April decision in a new decision issued in August 2018 but stayed its 
new decision for twenty days. The government has filed an appeal within the twenty-day period. See 
NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d. 457 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-5243 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 
10, 2018). In light of the pending appeal, the court has stayed its requirement that the government process 
initial DACA applications. However, the stay does not affect the government’s requirement to process 
DACA renewals. See NAACP v. Trump, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 143 (D.D.C. 2018). For updates on pending 
DACA litigation, see Status of Current DACA Litigation, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR. (last updated Feb. 
7, 2019), https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/status-current-daca-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/J7XM-
6V8V]. 
 58 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Response to January 2018 Preliminary Injunction, 
USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-response-january-2018-
preliminary-injunction [https://perma.cc/EX2W-VQMD]. Legal challenges to the DACA program 
continue. See Tal Kopan & Jason Morris, Texas Judge Hears Arguments on DACA Challenge, CNN 
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/08/politics/daca-hearing-texas/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8CHN-K4TF]. On August 31, 2018, Judge Hanen denied the plaintiffs’ request for a 
preliminary injunction. See Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 742 (S.D. Tex. 2018). Plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgement is currently pending before the district court. State of Texas v. United 
States, CT. LISTENER (last updated Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6382288/state-
of-texas-v-united-states-of-america/?page=4 [https://perma.cc/NPL2-WE6Z]. 




 60 Number of Form I-918, supra note 16. 
 61 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (2018). 
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that the agency may determine “bona fide” applicants and adjudicate 
employment authorization requests while they wait for their visa number to 
become current.62 
Second, Congress has unequivocally delegated to USCIS the authority 
to set fees for nonimmigrant visas.63 Exercising this authority, the agency 
routinely sets or modifies fees for various applications. To implement the 
nonimmigrant premium processing regime described above, for instance, the 
agency issued regulations establishing the timeline and the fee for submitting 
applications through the expedited route.64 Thus, there would appear to be no 
statutory obstacles to our proposal. 
III. DESIGN OPTIONS FOR PREMIUM PROCESSING OF INTERIM U BENEFITS 
Before we turn to a discussion of the potential benefits and drawbacks 
of premium processing in the U visa context, it might be helpful to consider 
a few potential design features. Our discussion is not intended to be 
comprehensive, as the programmatic details are best left to the agency in 
consultation with others. Rather, we endeavor only to get the discussion 
started with suggestions that might be attractive to both the agency and a 
diverse coalition of stakeholders. 
A. Timeline 
A central design question will concern the appropriate timeline for 
premium adjudication of interim U benefits. Here again it is helpful to refer 
back to recent agency precedents. The nonimmigrant- and employment-
based premium processing program requires adjudication within fifteen 
days, but the fees in such cases are considerably higher than would be 
appropriate in the U context. In the case of deferred adjudication and 
employment authorization through DACA, the agency’s processing goal has 
long been 120 days or less.65 
These benchmarks suggest that something in the range of 15 to 120 days 
would be both possible and appropriate in the U context. Notably, U visa 
conditional approvals are not significantly more complex than DACA or 
Premium Processing applications. Two additional points may be helpful for 
narrowing to a more precise timeline within that range. 
First, until it was revised on January 17, 2017, a regulation provided 
that the agency would adjudicate applications for employment authorization 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. § 1351; 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b) (2018). 
 64 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1)(i)(SS) (2018). 
 65 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 54. 
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within 90 days, and that failure to do so would “result in the grant of an 
employment authorization document for a period not to exceed 240 days.”66 
Although the government disputes that this regulation applied to pre-waitlist 
U applicants seeking interim employment authorization pursuant to 
§ 1184(p)(6), at least one federal court determined that it did.67 In any event, 
the point is that in recent history the agency implemented a scheme that 
promised a 90-day adjudication of work authorization across a broad range 
of eligibility categories, or, where that timeline was not met, automatic 
issuance of an interim work document.68 A new regulation or policy could 
adopt the same framework to implement the U statutory safety-valve. 
Perhaps the most relevant timeline to apply in this context can be 
gleaned from the legislative record of the bill that created the statutory 
safety-valve in the first place. The bill’s sponsors indicated that USCIS 
should “strive to issue work authorization and deferred action in most 
instances within 60 days of filing.”69 While the legislators clearly intended 
this expedience to apply to all U applicants, at the least it provides an easily 
defended benchmark for fee-based premium processing. 
These precedents suggest that something in the range of 60 to 90 days 
would be appropriate for expedited consideration of interim benefits on the 
basis of a pending U application. This would be a marked improvement on 
the multi-year limbo currently endured by all U applicants awaiting 
conditional approval. Further, for reasons discussed below, we suggest that 
the agency also adopt a clear and relatively prompt timeframe for interim 
approval in non-premium cases.70 Ideally, this “normal processing” 
timeframe would be less than 365 days.71 In any event, “victims of domestic 
violence, sexual assault and other violent crimes should not have to wait for 
up to a year before they can support themselves and their families.”72 
 
 66 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (revised Jan. 17, 2017); Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 16-CV-7092, 2018 WL 
4783977, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018). 
 67 Rodriguez, 2018 WL 4783977, at *16–*22. 
 68 Id. at *15. 
 69 See 154 CONG. REC. 24,603 (2008). 
 70 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 71 One federal circuit court has held that an agency delay of 1.5 years in the conditional approval 
stage was reasonable. See Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament, 877 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 2017) (“USCIS 
is dealing with an exponentially increasing number of U-Visa applications . . . Due to the circumstances 
USCIS faces and the agency’s recent changes to alleviate the backlog, we do not find Ramirez’s wait to 
be unreasonable at this time.”). Cf. Immigrant Witness and Victim Protection Act of 2018, H.R. Res. 
5058, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5058/text 
[https://perma.cc/7BVY-UVQT] (bill introduced by Reps. Jayapal & Panetta that would, inter alia, 
require agency adjudication of employment authorization within six months of filing for U status). 
 72 See 154 CONG. REC. 24,603 (2008). 
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B. Fee Amount 
DACA also provides a useful analogue regarding premium processing 
fees in the U context. That program suggests that a total fee of around $500 
would be cost-effective for the agency and appropriate in light of the need 
for the U program to continue providing access to critical protections for 
crime victims fleeing abusive situations.73 As mentioned, the applications are 
not materially different in terms of complexity, especially since the authority 
to award interim U benefits does not require a full and final adjudication of 
eligibility.74 USCIS could apply expedited processing to any U application 
for which the employment authorization and biometrics fees are paid—
whether or not the applicant would in fact be eligible for a fee waiver. 
Ultimately, the fee should be set at the minimal amount necessary to 
achieve the processing speeds that we propose. Anything in the vicinity of 
$500 would generate significantly increased revenue for the agency, 
warranting allocation of more resources to the issuance of interim benefits. 
Since fiscal year 2016, including derivative family members, over 60,000 
applications were filed for U status annually, and as of the most recently 
published data, the USCIS was on track to receive as many in fiscal year 
2018.75 Conservatively assuming that only one third of U applicants each 
year would request expedited processing through the $500 work 
authorization fee, the program could generate approximately $10 million in 
expedited processing fees annually. Moreover, many of those who filed 
applications previously and are currently waiting in the queue would also 
likely wish to submit the premium fee (and find the funds to do so), injecting 
a great deal of cash to the operation. These prior applicants would retain their 
spot in line for final adjudication of the U visa itself while expediting their 
interim benefits. All considered, even a relatively low premium fee should 
therefore result in substantially increased revenue for the agency. 
C. Level of Scrutiny 
Congress did not define the term “bona fide” when it enacted the U visa 
safety-valve.76 To be sure, however, Congress intended that interim 
 
 73 Although the INA lists twenty-nine or so qualifying categories of crime for purposes of U visa 
eligibility, claims brought by noncitizens fleeing domestic violence undoubtedly make up an extremely 
large percentage of U applications. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii); see, e.g., Natalie Nanasi, The U 
Visa’s Failed Promise for Survivors of Domestic Violence, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 280 
(“Although the U visa is available to victims of a wide range of crimes, Congress’ intent to connect the 
visa to the fight against domestic violence, and violence against women more generally, is 
unmistakable.”). 
 74 See infra Part III.C. 
 75 Number of Form I-918, supra note 16. 
 76 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (2018). 
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adjudication in this context would involve a threshold determination short of 
full merits review.77 Furthermore, the agency has already promulgated a 
regulatory definition for the bona fide standard in the T visa scheme, which 
is a related statutory provision that provides benefits and protection for 
victims of human trafficking. In that context, the bona fide threshold is 
satisfied once the agency has conducted an initial review and “determined 
that the application does not appear to be fraudulent, is complete and 
properly filed, includes completed fingerprint and background checks, and 
presents prima facie evidence of eligibility . . . .”78 While the agency might 
well prefer to adopt a different definition of “bona fide” for purposes of 
implementing premium processing for U applicants, the T visa regulation is, 
at the least, instructive as to what the standard might look like. 
Since the agency principally defends its failure to implement 
§ 1184(p)(6) on the grounds that the U visa officers’ limited resources are 
consumed with the complex task of adjudicating the merits of U applications 
(including associated waivers of any inadmissibility grounds), application of 
an appropriately preliminary bona fide standard will considerably relieve the 
pressure. At this early stage in the U process, to satisfy congressional intent, 
agency workers need only determine that applications are complete, present 
prima facie evidence of eligibility, and do not appear to be fraudulent. The 
agency already generates biometrics appointments within a month or so of 
filing, which would reveal whether applicants or their derivative family 
members have outstanding warrants or significant criminal histories. As 
explained above, the introduction of a premium processing fee, even if 
modest, should easily provide the agency with sufficient resources to 
conduct this level of review. 
Having sketched these considerations for development of the main 
components of our proposal, we will now turn to a more detailed discussion 
of the benefits and drawbacks of our proposal in the final Part. 
IV. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF PREMIUM PROCESSING 
A. Potential Benefits 
The implementation of expedited interim consideration in the U visa 
process portends a number of benefits. Most importantly, this innovation 
would provide much more timely protection for crime victims willing to help 
 
 77  Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 16-CV-7092, 2018 WL 4783977, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) 
(“The parties agree that section 1184(p)(6) EAD Pending Petition requires a preliminary determination 
short of a full adjudication on the merits of a U Visa application—pending petitions need only be bona 
fide, not meritorious.”). 
 78 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(a) (2018). 
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law enforcement while also helping to reduce crime. As mentioned 
previously, a new applicant for a U visa today might wait four years or more 
before receiving even temporary relief; many might not see any benefits until 
final adjudication after a decade. This lengthy and uncertain period of limbo 
deters many victims of serious crime from coming forward, out of fear that 
their interactions with law enforcement could result in negative immigration 
consequences long before they receive interim deferred action and 
employment authorization, let alone official U status.79 
Indeed, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has clarified that 
a pending U application generally will not stave off removal proceedings.80 
As a result, even noncitizens courageous enough to assist law enforcement 
and file U applications often continue to find themselves in crisis situations.81 
The government’s failure to promptly process interim benefits for U 
applications thus undercuts the essential goals of the program: reducing 
crime and providing aid to victims. Measures that reinforce noncitizens’ 
incentives to report serious crime benefit not only those individual victims 
but also communities more broadly, because reporting and cooperation 
increases the likelihood that perpetrators will be brought to justice, rather 
than remain free to harm again. 
The excessive delay in these preliminary adjudications also means that 
applicants must continue working unlawfully to support themselves or their 
families while awaiting adjudication of employment authorization requests. 
If an expedited processing line was available, crime victims with bona fide 
U applications would be able to work with permission much sooner. This 
would generate broad economic gains, as individuals who are present in or 
working unlawfully in the United States are far more vulnerable to abuse by 
employers.82 Lawfully authorized employees face fewer obstacles in filing 
 
 79 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 80 See, e.g., AILA/ICE Liaison Meeting Minutes, AILA Doc. No. 18011132, ¶¶ 2–3, 4 (Oct. 26, 
2017) (on file with author) (official statement from ICE that its trial attorneys “should not administratively 
close cases where applications are pending with other agencies” including U visas). Where USCIS does 
not indicate prima facie eligibility for U status within five days, “ICE will generally proceed with 
removal.” Id. In addition, “[o]n a case-by-case basis in extraordinary circumstances, the Chief Counsel 
may—with the concurrence of the NTA issuing agency (i.e. USCIS, CBP, ICE ERO or ICE HSI)—agree 
to administratively close or dismiss a case.” Id. at ¶ 2. 
 81 See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era of Mass Immigration 
Enforcement, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 433, 434–35 (2018) (discussing the government’s attempt to deport 
Jeanette Vizguerra despite her pending U application and lack of significant criminal history). 
 82 This point is particularly salient for work-related U visa crimes, where the glacial pace of the 
process often allows continued workplace exploitation or abuse. See, e.g., Michael Grabell, Exploitation 
and Abuse at the Chicken Plant, NEW YORKER (May 8, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2017/05/08/exploitation-and-abuse-at-the-chicken-plant [https://perma.cc/Q4D9-LBY8]; 
KQED News Staff, Undocumented Immigrants Still Mistreated by Employers Despite New Laws, KQED 
NEWS (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.kqed.org/news/146984/undocumented-immigrants-still-mistreated-
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personal income tax returns, while their employers, conversely, face greater 
hurdles should they endeavor to shirk payroll taxes and other workplace 
obligations. Relatedly, lawful employees benefit from increased purchasing 
power, since they can avail themselves of minimum wage protections and 
other worker protection laws. 
Because inadmissibility grounds related to unlawful employment 
typically are waived for U visa applicants, the agency’s failure to provide 
timely employment authorization does little to curb unlawful employment.83 
Instead, delayed authorization just makes it more likely that workers 
continue to be exploited through under-payment or poor conditions of 
employment.84 This, in turn, can have negative spillover effects for other 
workers including United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. 
Faster interim adjudication would also benefit families and 
communities. U visa applicants would no longer live under the threat of 
removal, or, worse, being deported and subject to lengthy reentry bars, only 
to lawfully reenter the United States when their visas are finally adjudicated 
many years later. Further, faster processing would reduce the ambiguities for 
employers, law enforcement, and other stakeholders who might be uncertain 
how to interpret an individual’s pending application for a U visa.85 For all 
these reasons, more rapid preliminary adjudication would promote 
 
by-employers-despite-new-laws [https://perma.cc/V3XG-DL5A]. For a good discussion of eligibility and 
obstacles in seeking U visas for work-related crimes, see Eunice Hyunhye Cho et al., A New 
Understanding of Substantial Abuse: Evaluating Harm in U Visa Petitions for Immigrant Victims of 
Workplace Crime, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2014). 
 83 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14) (2018). 
 84 See, e.g., Grabell, supra note 82; KQED News Staff, supra note 82. 
 85 There are also important ancillary benefits of deferred action in some states, such as the ability to 
obtain driver’s licenses or other state benefits. See, e.g., Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
Rescission Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/publications/Pages/Deferred-Action-for-Childhood-Arrivals-
FAQ.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MBG-LJU5] (California allows individuals under deferred action to receive 
Medi-Cal benefits if they are otherwise eligible); Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, NAT’L CONF. 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 25, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/deferred-
action.aspx [https://perma.cc/4ZQG-76R6] (every state allows issuance of driver’s licenses to DACA 
recipients). These ancillary benefits may have broadly positive economic impact. See, e.g., Zachary Basu, 
Report: Dreamers Contribute $42 Billion to Annual GDP, AXIOS.COM (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.axios.com/daca-economic-contribution-by-the-numbers-9977933d-6313-40a7-b855-
5d12ad490cb5.html [https://perma.cc/XM2T-HF7Y] (finding that DACA recipients contribute billions 
of dollars to the U.S. Treasury and annual GDP); Martin Heinrich, Dreamers Contribute to Our Economy, 
THEHILL.COM (Oct. 4, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/353774-dreamers-
contribute-to-our-economy [https://perma.cc/T8AV-WAAP] (finding that DACA recipients increase 
strength of economy); Tom K. Wong et al., DACA Recipients’ Economic and Educational Gains Continue 
to Grow, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
immigration/news/2017/08/28/437956/daca-recipients-economic-educational-gains-continue-grow/ 
[https://perma.cc/S7E6-6SUR] (reporting on positive economic impact of DACA). 
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consistency, transparency, fairness, and law-abiding behavior including 
above-board economic activity. 
Increased attention on the conditional approval stage would also benefit 
the government. As already mentioned, USCIS would garner more revenue.86 
While this would not in itself constitute a benefit for the public good, the 
government’s amplified ability to use the revenue gains to faithfully execute 
the law would be a positive development. Additionally, through an expedited 
preliminary consideration process, the agency could promptly identify 
applications that are incomplete, lacking in prima facie eligibility, or 
apparently fraudulent.87 Early identification of cases that fail to meet the bona 
fide threshold, even if infrequent, would help clear the backlog, thereby 
speeding up final adjudication of meritorious applications. And in any event, 
even if a case receives interim employment authorization and deferred 
action, the agency would retain flexibility to revoke these benefits or deny 
the application at any point later in the process when more careful scrutiny 
may reveal an eligibility issue.88 This, too, was contemplated by Congress’s 
allocation of authority to conditionally approve applications appearing to be 
“bona fide.”89 
An expedited processing option might also incentivize applicants to 
pull together funds for the fees more generally, defraying the government’s 
overall cost of the U visa program. Some applicants may be able to receive 
financial assistance from advocacy organizations or crowd-sourced funding 
platforms.90 Additionally, in some states, crime victims’ assistance funds 
 
 86 See supra Part III.E. 
 87 Because the statutory safety-valve provision envisions threshold determinations solely for the 
purposes of employment authorization and deferred action, rather than full merit review for U status, it 
would be inappropriate to deny U applications at this early stage unless they clearly fail to meet the bona 
fide standard. 
 88 Occasionally, applicants with particularly egregious criminal histories may not only fail to qualify 
for U status but warrant consideration for removal. Under current policy, USCIS has the discretion to 
issue a Notice to Appear (NTA) once the U application is denied or benefits are terminated. See Updated 
Guidance for the Referral of Cases and Issuance of Notices to Appear (NTAs) in Cases Involving 
Inadmissible and Deportable Aliens, USCIS (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-PM-602-0050.1-
Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T6H-G4KZ]. 
 89 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (2018) (“The Secretary may grant work authorization to any alien who 
has a pending, bona fide application for nonimmigrant status under section 1101(a)(15)(U).”); 8 CFR 
§ 214.14(d)(2) (2018) (“USCIS will grant deferred action or parole to U-1 petitioners and qualifying 
family members while . . . on the waiting list. USCIS, in its discretion, may authorize employment for 
such petitioners and qualifying family members.”). 
 90 See, e.g., Darlena Cunha & Avi Selk, These Parents Hoped to Raise $1,500 for Separated Migrant 
Families. Pledges Now Total $15 Million., WASH. POST (June 21, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2018/06/19/these-parents-hoped-to-raise-1500-
for-separated-families-then-their-facebook-fundraiser-went-viral/ [https://perma.cc/756E-GJN8] 
(describing fundraising campaign on Facebook to benefit migrant children separated from their parents 
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might be utilized to satisfy the expedited fee for premium processing, as well 
as other U visa costs.91 Where necessary, states should consider clarifying or 
amending their policies to ensure that immigrant victims of serious crime 
can use criminal justice funds to access these critical benefits. 
Importantly, fee-based expedited processing would likely have positive 
impacts even for individuals who do not request expedited processing. 
Because every applicant requesting expedited processing would translate to 
one less applicant waiting in the “regular” line for interim benefits, there 
would presumably be a spillover effect, accelerating the process for every 
applicant. Further, the agency would be well-advised to use the increase in 
revenue to improve the timeliness of U conditional adjudication across the 
board, thus avoiding litigation, as discussed elsewhere in this essay. For 
example, if expedited requests are to be processed within 60 days (or some 
other range not to exceed 120 days), lowering the maximum timeframe for 
interim benefits to something in the vicinity of 365 days might be appropriate 
for the rest. 
Despite the substantial benefits that would flow from our proposal, 
there are also significant drawbacks. In the following section, we address the 
most likely objections. 
 
that ultimately raised over $20 million dollars); Ashley Daley, GoFundMe Started for Dreamer Ineligible 
for Federal Student Loans, WCNC (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/gofundme-
started-for-dreamer-ineligible-for-federal-student-loans/275-527417039 [https://perma.cc/SH54-AC86] 
(describing a GoFundMe campaign that raised $10,000 for DACA recipient to attend college); Kelly 
Heyboer, ICE Wanted to Deport This N.J. Man Over an Old Conviction. He Fought Back -- and Won., 
NJ.COM (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2018/09/ice_wanted_to_deport_this_
nj_man_over_an_old_convi.html [https://perma.cc/2H7T-Q2KL] (describing GoFundMe campaign to 
raise funds for deportation defense legal assistance, naturalization, and in support of organizations that 
work on similar issues). 
 91 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Leahy, Leahy Announces $9.3 Million in Grants to 
Support Vermont Crime Victims And Domestic Violence Survivors (Oct. 4, 2016), 
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-announces-93-m-in-grants-to-support-vt-crime-victims-and-
domestic-violence-survivors [https://perma.cc/LK4J-42BP] (emphasizing that immigrant crime victims 
have equal access to state assistance funds); Application for Vermont Victims Compensation, VT. CTR. 
FOR CRIME VICTIM SERVS., http://www.ccvs.vermont.gov/assets/documents/Comp%20App%
205_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/79FE-E923] (listing “safety” and “security” as appropriate uses of 
funds); Complete Application Packet, HAW. CRIME VICTIM COMP. COMM’N, http://dps.hawaii.gov/
cvcc/files/2013/01/CVCC-Complete-Application-Packet.pdf [https://perma.cc/W67T-Y8EC] (indicating 
that funds may be used to compensate for and alleviate suffering); Emergency Fund, MINN. DEP’T OF 
PUB. SAFETY, https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ojp/help-for-crime-victims/Pages/emergency-fund.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/JQ6U-QJ6J] (indicating that funds may be used to obtain critical documents); 
Instructions for Completing the Application for Crime Victim Compensation, ALA. VIOLENT CRIMES 
COMP. BD., http://doa.alaska.gov/vccb/pdf/ApplicationInstructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWJ4-95D2] 
(indicating that funds may be used to ensure the victim’s safety). 
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B. Potential Drawbacks 
1. Expedited Processing Could Exacerbate Class Distinctions and 
Disadvantage the Most Vulnerable Crime Victims 
The U visa was designed to incentivize victims of serious crimes to 
assist law enforcement and seek aid. Because most U visa applicants are 
undocumented, interactions with law enforcement are understandably 
fraught with anxiety. These applicants may well number among the most 
vulnerable residents in the country. A fast lane that is available only to 
individuals with resources may particularly disadvantage low-income crime 
victims who cannot work or are unable to save their earnings. Many would 
nevertheless find a way to pay the fees, by borrowing if necessary, in light 
of the potential opportunity for increased security and higher earning power. 
Crowd-sourced campaigns and crime victims’ assistance funds might help 
others, as we have suggested. But at the end of the day, not everyone would 
be able to afford the premium fee. These individuals could remain out of 
status for many years, weathering abusive employment conditions or living 
under the constant threat of deportation. This is a serious concern, and one 
that could invite legal challenges and policy critiques. 
The USCIS premium processing program again provides a useful 
analogue to gauge the potential strength of litigation on this front, as it was 
challenged on equal protection grounds.92 In Wilson v. INS, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the program unconstitutionally discriminated based on income 
level.93 The federal district court hearing the challenge applied rational basis 
review, noting that the Supreme Court has “rejected the suggestion that 
statutes having different effects on the wealthy and the poor should, on that 
account alone, be subjected to strict equal protection scrutiny.”94 The court 
found rational the government’s stated objectives of raising funds, 
investigating fraud, implementing customer service initiatives, eliminating 
adjudication backlogs, reaching a goal of six-month processing times, and 
supporting the adjudication of applications for all immigration benefits.95 
Accordingly, the court allowed the program to proceed. 
Because income level is not a suspect classification, and because the U 
visa program does not directly impact any judicially-recognized fundamental 
rights, an applicant-financed expedited process for interim adjudication 
would also likely receive and survive rational basis review.96 Furthermore, 
 
 92 See Wilson v. INS, No. 02-CV-71738-DT, 2002 WL 33001241 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2002). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. (citing Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988)). 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 457–58; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1980); Ortwein v. 
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973). 
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while a fee-based expedited program for preliminary U benefits would treat 
applicants who are able to afford the fee more favorably, it would do so only 
for this limited, short-term purpose. Final merits adjudication in the U 
process would not be a function of premium processing in any way, but 
instead would continue to proceed based on the order in which applications 
are filed with the agency after visas become available. 
Although a premium interim U benefit scheme thus would survive 
litigation, it would remain problematic as a matter of basic fairness. A 
program that treats wealthier (or better connected) crime victims more 
favorably leaves a bad taste and resonates with other pay-to-play schemes 
that, even if not illegal or violative of equal protection doctrine, are 
inconsistent with the spirit of equality. Nevertheless, a number of factors 
mitigate this concern. First, it bears reemphasizing, a faster route 
to conditional approval and deferred action does not guarantee final 
approval. Rather, the option would alleviate the legal ambiguity facing many 
U visa applicants while their applications are pending. Further, regardless of 
wealth, deferred action is entirely revocable if an applicant engages in 
dangerous behavior, or if, ultimately, the applicant’s petition for U status is 
denied.97 
Second, as mentioned previously, a faster conditional process would 
also encourage potential applicants to report crimes and work with law 
enforcement since the benefits of doing so would be more immediate. The 
crime-fighting and community-protective goals of the U visa are furthered, 
though admittedly not fully realized, when the program’s mechanics 
incentivize more individuals to come forward. 
Finally, as we have argued, it is also quite possible that an expedited 
processing line would end up improving the conditional approval stage for 
the entire pool. Because the expedited processing applicants would be 
removed from the general line, a spillover effect could result in across-the-
board gains. Even a slight acceleration in processing times would be an 
improvement over the current status quo. 
For all these reasons, it seems likely that a premium processing route in 
the interim U status adjudication process would not run afoul of equal 
protection mandates and would remain an overall positive innovation despite 
(lamentably) being inaccessible to some applicants for financial reasons. 
That said, the agency could mitigate the costs of potential litigation or 
unequal treatment on this front by simultaneously adopting our 
 
 97 See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 694 (2015) 
(“If favorable action is warranted, DACA applicants receive ‘deferred action,’ which amounts to a 
revocable assurance that they are not going to be a priority for deportation for at least two years.”). 
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recommendation to improve interim processing to some significant extent 
for all applicants—e.g., one year or less. 
 
2. Premium Processing Undercuts Legislative Reforms 
Another possible objection to an expedited processing line is that this 
approach would reduce congressional incentives to raise the U visa cap or 
implement other ameliorating legislation. To be sure, if Congress fails to act, 
the U visa backlog will continue to grow larger over time, and applicants 
with meritorious cases will be stuck for more than a decade with only 
deferred action, rather than the comparatively more secure U status.98 As the 
backlog of U applicants continues to increase, the category could become 
less attractive to potential applicants, even if they could obtain deferred 
action relatively quickly. Thus, this too is a legitimate and weighty concern. 
At least two factors are relevant, however. First, the hope that a 
congressional fix waits in the wings is highly speculative. The path to 
immigration reform in general is notoriously gridlocked.99 While two 
members of the House of Representatives introduced a bill in 2018 that 
would remove the annual cap on U visas and require the agency to grant 
employment authorization within six months, there is little indication that 
this proposal or similar measures will soon find much traction in either 
house.100 Indeed, in the current political climate, even the crime-fighting 
narrative behind the U visa might not save it from reductions should 
Congress turn its attention to comprehensive immigration legislation in the 
near future. 
The second and more important point is that removal of the annual cap 
presents a distinct issue. Removing the annual cap could remain part of the 
legislative agenda even if discretion over the interim-approval timeline 
remains in the hands of the agency. Indeed, if the U visa process becomes 
more financially sustainable, that might well encourage Congress to increase 
the statutory cap, benefiting everyone. In the meantime, many of the 
problems that flow from the current situation—including applicants’ 
continued vulnerability to exploitation and lack of protection against 
removal—could be relieved by an expedited processing program. 
 
 98 Deferred action is actually a form of prosecutorial discretion rather than a full-fledged form of 
nonimmigrant status. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2018). 
 99 See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, After 16 Futile Years, Congress Will Try 
Again to Legalize ‘Dreamers’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/
politics/dream-act-daca-trump-congress-dreamers.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5K2H-ME9S]. 
 100 Immigrant Witness and Victim Protection Act of 2018, H.R. Res. 5058, 115th Cong. (2018), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5058/text [https://perma.cc/7BVY-UVQT]. 
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CONCLUSION 
In an ideal world, noncitizen victims of serious crime should not have 
to pay the agency to provide statutorily authorized benefits. But the reality 
facing U applicants today is far from ideal. The drastically oversubscribed 
annual U visa quota, along with the agency’s failure to implement the 
statutory safety-valve through timely conditional adjudication, has created 
an untenable situation for immigrant victims of serious crime. This has 
significant negative consequences for individual immigrants and immigrant 
communities, who are more vulnerable than ever to continued exploitation 
or deportation despite pending U applications. In this moment of crisis, the 
time has come to seriously consider outside-of-the-box solutions, such as the 
interim expedited processing option that we propose here. 
Although there are palpable downsides to our proposal, we believe that 
the anticipated benefits outweigh them. Even if some vulnerable crime 
victims are temporarily disadvantaged in comparison to those who are able 
to marshal the fee, a spillover effect may result in faster consideration for all 
applicants. Furthermore, it is possible that advocacy groups, crowd-sourced 
initiatives, or victims’ assistance programs could help fund expedited 
processing for many applicants who are otherwise unable to pull together the 
fee, further mitigating this disparity. And in any event, the agency should 
strive to decrease processing times to a year or less for all applicants, 
including those who cannot opt for a premium route. 
This proposal is a distinctly second-best reform, trailing behind an 
expansion of the statutory annual cap or an agency willing to implement the 
statutory safety-valve on its own accord. Nevertheless, it has much to 
recommend it as a stop-gap measure. At bottom, our proposal is a pragmatic 
one that incentivizes USCIS to do better by crime victims and communities, 
whether or not litigation or legislation makes any headway. At the least, we 
hope this Essay will serve to ignite a dialogue between advocates and the 
agency that will ultimately result in long-needed programmatic 
improvements, bringing the U process closer to Congress’s intended design. 
 
